line with that argument, scholars have opined that the ECHR system should focus on an approach in which the ECtHR would be involved only if there are good reasons to depart from interpretation at the national level. 8 Nonetheless, others recently doubted the overall usefulness of such an understanding of subsidiarity, since those member states responsible for the lion's share of new applications to the ECHR often neither possess a functioning judiciary nor functioning judicial or executive institutions, in general.
9
The debate on the proper role and definition of subsidiarity in the Strasbourg system is reflective of current discussions about the proper role and interaction of national judiciaries with the Strasbourg court. Member states' national courts struggle with the influence and interpretative authority of Strasbourg's jurisprudence at the national level. 
II. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and the ECtHR: Görgülü, Caroline, and Subsequent Decisions
Before delving right into the heart of the matter, it is essential to read the current judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in light of its previous decisions that had tackled its relationship with the ECtHR. Despite earlier decisions of that Court already adopting the much-cited interpretative approach toward the ECHR and the ECtHR's judgments,
11
the Görgülü decision is widely recognized to be the Bundesverfassungsgericht's first important case on the matter.
12 Görgülü dealt with a
Turkish father who wanted the German courts to enforce his right to visit his daughter.
13
He lost at all levels and achieved a judgment in his favor only in Strasbourg. 14 Still, even after the ECtHR's decision, the national judges were none too keen to follow the ECtHR's ruling. In particular, the lower regional court in charge stated that the ECtHR's judgments were binding only on the state of Germany as a subject of international law, but not on the [Vol. 13 No. 06 760 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l judiciary as independent organ in charge of the administration of justice. 15 Mr. Görgülü therefore returned to the Bundesverfassungsgericht claiming that his right to a fair trial had been violated.
In its judgment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, noting that the ECHR had initially requi red implementation into national law, began by pointing to the fact that ECHR provisions only have the legal force of ordinary federal law, which ranks below the Basic Law. Nonetheless, the Court found that judgments of the ECtHR serve as aids with regard to interpreting constitutional rights under German law and national courts had a general duty to follow the interpretations of the ECtHR. This results from the friendliness of the Basic Law towards international law, as seen both in the Preamble and in Articles 24 and 25 of the Basic Law. 16 But due to the status of the ECHR in the national legal order -having the status of an ordinary law and ranking below the Constitution-the Court held that national courts were not obliged to follow Strasbourg in all circumstances: they could put forward specific reasons explaining why they decide to depart from the ECHR's jurisprudence. As the Bundesverfassungsgericht put it, "The responsible authorities or courts must discernibly consider the decision and, if necessar y, justify understandably why they nevertheless do not follow the international -law interpretation of the law."
17
The Bundesverfassungsgericht concluded that it must have appellate jurisdiction for complainants' appeals arising from claims that national authorities had misapplied or ignored a decision of the ECtHR.
18
While the Görgülü case was going back and forth between the ECtHR and the lower courts, scholars disagreed on whether the ECHR and judgments of the ECtHR were only to be considered by national courts if they were found to have legal effects in national law. 21 The Görgülü decision might be understood to require this, since it dealt with a case where the ECtHR had ruled in ruled in favor of the claimant.
22
Nonetheless, prior decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht had already considered the ECHR and the ECtHR's judgments, as well as the doctrine of the friendliness of the Basic Law towards the ECHR, without assessing whether the ECtHR judgments had a legal effect in national law. 23 And the Görgülü decision itself had not made the duty to consider the ECtHR's judgments dependent upon the legal effect of the judgment.
24
In the subsequent Caroline judgment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht consulted the jurisprudence of the ECtHR without discussing the question of a legal effect of the ECtHR's judgments in German national law. 25 In so doing, the Court affirmed that its interpretive approach is not conditioned upon on that effect in national law. 26 Nonetheless, Caroline [Vol. 13 No. 06 762 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l raised further questions with regard to the interpretative force of the ECHR in the German national legal order. The case, which different senates of the German Supreme Court decided oppositely, 27 dealt, amongst others, with a tabloid newspaper story published about Caroline von Hannover and some accompanying photos which showed her on holiday in a public street. Even though the princess had objected, the story was eventually published together with the pictures. The courts had to reconcile her right to privacy with the rights of the press to freedom of the press. In Caroline, the Bundesverfassungsgericht used the doctrine of the ECHR as an aid in the interpretation of constitutional rights and argued that national courts had to consider the restrictive nature of Article 8 of the ECHR when assessing the freedom of the press under the German constitution. 28 At the same time, it acknowledged that this method should not result in any restriction or lowering of the standard of constitutional protection already in existence under the Basic Law.
29
Following the judgment, scholars doubted whether the ECHR could be regarded as a formal restriction on basic rights under the Basic Law, particularly in cases involving multiple parties in which different rights had to be balanced against one other. 30 Payandeh pointed out that this would require the relevant provisions of the ECHR to be directly applicable in German law. 31 In turn, he argued that direct applicability would require that the rights enshrined in the ECHR be sufficiently clear. 32 In his view, this was not the case. Moreover, it had to fulfill the rule of law requirements under Article 20(3) of the Basic Law. Therefore, in situations involving multiple parties, which would require the balancing of several basic rights and would potentially involve decisi ons of the executive, legislature, or judiciary-any of which could address the core of the very rights involved-possible violations of basic rights would have to be addressed by a formal law issued by the legislature.
34
The wording of the Caroline judgment is ambiguous on this point. [Vol. 13 No. 06 764 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l fundamental rights and come to a different conclusion than the ECHR, as was the case in the Caroline decision. Resolving this situation also needed to wait until 4 May 2011.
B. The Judgment of 4 May 2011
The judgment of 4 May 2011 is the second major and principled pronouncement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht since Görgülü. It addresses the question of the legal effect of the ECHR in national law and whether the ECHR can serve as a law restricting the exercise of constitutional rights under the Basic Law. It also proposes a way of dealing with the ECtHR's findings in cases concerning conflicting constitutional rights. Despite the answers it gives with regard to those questions, the ultimate approach of the Bundesverfassungsgericht still leaves room for further interpretation. 47 Eventually, following the proceedings before the ECtHR, the German laws on preventive detention were amended. 48 The provisions on preventive detention were deleted. 49 Nevertheless, the new provisions applied only to cases that were decided on or after 1 January 2011, the date on which the new laws came into force. 50 For crimes committed prior to that date, the old laws still applied.
51

C. The Court's Findings on Its Relationship with the ECHR
The impact and importance of the ECHR's findings on the German body of rules on preventive detention has been discussed in depth earlier in this journal and shall not be discussed further here. 52 Probably the most innovative part of the judgment concerns the relationship of the Bundesverfassungsgericht with the ECtHR. 53 The Constitutional Court addressed both the effect of judgments of the ECtHR in German constitutional law and the question whether the ECHR can be held to restrict fundamental rights under the Basic Law. It also proposed a solution on how the ECtHR's case law can be accommodated by the national law in further cases concerning, for example, the weighing of conflicting constitutional rights.
Concerning the first issue, the Court reaffirmed that the ECHR, as well as the ECtHR's judgments, serve as an aid to the interpretation of constitutional rights. They determine the content and scope of constitutional rights as well as rule of law principles of the Basic Law, as long as they do not restrict the Basic Law's own scope of protection. 54 Moreover, the Court determined that the persuasive force of judgments of the ECtHR might also be derived from the leading and guiding role of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which 47 Id. In addition, and most importantl y, the Bundesverfassungsgericht explicitly rejected the view that judgments of the ECtHR were persuasive at the national level only if the case considered by the ECtHR concerned the same underlying factual situation and had acquired legal effect in national law. 57 According to the Court, the domestic effect of judgments of the ECtHR followed from Articles 20(3) and 59(2) of the German Basic Law, 58
i.e., rule of law considerations, as well as from the ECHR's incorporation into national law.
59
This meant that the obligation to recognize the judgments of the ECtHR at the domestic level was not limited to cases with the same underlying factual situation. 60 On the contrary, bearing in mind the precedential effect of decisions of international courts and tribunals, the Basic Law sought to prevent conflicts between the international obligations of the Republic of Germany and national law.
61
The Court further alluded to the fact that the friendliness of the Basic Law towards international law was reflected in an understanding of sovereignty which was not against an involvement in international and supranational contexts or those contexts' further development; rather, the friendliness anticipated these developments and took them for granted. 62 The friendliness of the Basic Law towards international law also called for judgments of the ECHR to be taken into consideration. 63 This latter duty was reflected in the content of the Basic Law itself, in particular Article 1, which accords a special protection to the common core of all human rights. Even though the friendliness of the Basic Law towards international law created a duty to consider the ECHR and the ECHR's judgments when interpreting constitutional rights, the Court held that this consideration needed to be resul t-oriented. 65 The interpretation of constitutional notions in light of the ECHR did not imply a parallel use of identical concepts or notions at the ECHR and the national levels. 66 Even though it was certainly desirable for national laws to be harmonized with the Convention, this was not compulsory. The nations were free to choose the appropriate means to fulfill their obligations under the ECHR.
67
For further illustration of the actual relationship of the Basic Law with the Convention, the Bundesverfassungsgericht resorted to substantive and methodological arguments. 68 That is, it considered an interpretation of the Basic Law in light of the ECHR and the EC tHR's judgments to be inappropriate, where the protection of the Basic Law would be undercut by resorting to the ECHR's standard (which is a thought already reflected by Article 53 of the ECHR). It also held an interpretation in light of the ECHR to be inappropriate where an interpretation in light of the ECHR did not comply with the methods of constitu tional interpretation.
69
The Bundesverfassungsgericht identified two examples of when this could actually be the case. First, the obligation to recognize the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as well as the ECHR, could be suspended in multipolar situations invo lving more than one affected party, where the rights involved needed to be carefully balanced against each other, and where more protection given to one would imply less protection to the other. 70 Second, the Bundesverfassungsgericht would be barred from recognizing the 65 Id. ¶ 91. 66 Id. The imposition of a preventive detention could be imposed after a previous finding of guilt and imposition of a regular penalty, since it was not regarded as "penalty," but as "correction measure," according to [Vol. 13 No. 06 768 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l jurisprudence of the ECHR or the rights enshrined in the ECHR in cases where they conflicted with the "recognized methods of constitutional or statutory interpretation." 71 In this regard, the Court referred to the regular methods of constitutional interpretation, the core rights theory, and Article 79(3) of the Basic Law, which refers to the guarantee of prevalence.
72
The reference by the Bundesverfassungsgericht to multipolar relations between various affected parties tackles the question on how ECtHR interpretations can be accommodated in cases where various rights need to be weighed against each other. Even though the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Caroline had made clear that the interpretations of the ECHR by the ECtHR needed to be taken i nto account also in those cases, it had not taken a view on whether the ECtHR's interpretations could also be set aside, if the balancing of interests so required. Moreover, the Court still needed to turn to the debate upon the question whether the ECHR could be used as a formal restriction to constitutional rights.
73
Therefore, the Court first reaffirmed that the ECHR cannot be utilized to legitimize restrictions of constitutional rights where the constitutional rights of different actors are at stake. 74 This follows already from the substantive consideration that the standard of the Basic Law may not be undercut by the ECHR or the findings of the ECtHR: 75 If certain constitutional rights can, for example, only be restricted by law, their restriction in li ght of other constitutional interests requires a law which takes this relationship into account. 76 Second, turning to the question as to whether the ECtHR's interpretations needed to be taken into account in all cases, the Court held that where different c onstitutional rights compete against each other, even a ground-breaking decision and interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR needs to be balanced against all the other rights involved in the underlying context: It constituted only one interpretation of one right in a situation involving possibly many different rights. 77 Thus, the Court did not exclude that a balancing Germany's Dialogue with Strasbourg Bundesverfassungsgericht's Relationship with the European Court of Human Rights in the Preventive Detention Decision
D. Concluding Observations
The Bundesverfassungsgericht's preventive detention judgment of 4 May 2011 provides some important clarifications concerning relationship with the ECHR. The judgment answers some of the questions that remained after the Görgülü and Caroline decisions. First, the method of constitutional interpretation in the light of the ECHR is not restricted to ECHR cases that have acquired legal effect in German law. Second, the method of inclusive constitutional interpretation may not cause the ECHR to be invoked in a way that restricts constitutional rights in cases concerning multiple rights relationships.
Regarding the methods of constitutional interpretation, the Bundesverfassungsgericht made clear that any interpretation of constitutional rights in light of the ECHR would have to remain within the general framework of recognized methods of constitutional interpretation. The Bundesverfassungsgericht clarified that it will not adopt the same methods of interpretation utilized by the ECHR. It is not compelled to do so. States are free to choose the methods by which they want to render ECHR rights effective at the national level. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, also affirmed that it has to take the reasoning of the ECtHR into account in its interpretation of the Basic Law.
Concerning the more abstract relationship and the al location of competences between the ECHR and national constitutional courts, the Bundesverfassungsgericht adopted a solution which builds upon a cooperative and dialogue-based relationship with the ECHR. It goes even further than previous judgments insofa r as the Bundesverfassungsgericht's 4 May 2011 judgment did not focus on strict separation of ECtHR competences from its own. It promoted an integrative solution and sought to combine the reasoning and jurisprudence of the ECtHR with national constitutional interpretation as much as possible, in particular by suggesting the application of the principle of proportionality. 92 Therefore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht's decision may have positive implications for the understanding of the concept of subsidiarity, which can guide the future relationship of the ECHR with the member states. This judgment reveals a cooperative understanding of subsidiarity, which builds upon the dialogue between national courts and the ECHR. It appears to tend towards a conception of subsidiarity, which is similar to the doctrine of dialogic or polyphonic federalism, which has been advocated in American constitutional theory. 93 Since federalism usually entails a dualist approach to the relations between the 
